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How Well Are the Nation's Children Protected from Peer
Harassment at School?: Title IX Liability in the Wake of Davis
v. Monroe County Board of Education
Penelope Jones, a child who has cerebral palsy and is deaf in one
ear, was enrolled at a public high school, even though she functioned
at a first-grade level.' The principal and two special education
teachers assured Penelope's mother, Ms. Murrell, that they would
carefully supervise Penelope, as she had been sexually assaulted at
her prior school.2 "John Doe," a male special education student with
a history of inappropriate sexual behavior, approached Penelope at
school and made harassing phone calls to her home.3 He allegedly
assaulted Penelope several times, including one occasion during
which he took her to an isolated area of the school and sexually
assaulted her to the point that she vomited on herself and bled.4
Several teachers allegedly knew of the incident, but did not report it
to Penelope's mother and directed Penelope not to tell her mother
about the assault.5 Because of the assaults, Penelope became self-
destructive and suicidal, requiring admittance into a psychiatric
hospital.6
When Penelope entered the hospital, her mother first learned of
the sexual assaults and batteries.7 Ms. Murrell contacted Penelope's
teachers and attempted to contact the principal, who neither returned
her calls nor investigated the assaults.8 Ms. Murrell sued the school
district, alleging a violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 ("Title IX"). 9
1. See Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver Public Schools), 186 F.3d 1238, 1243
(10th Cir. 1999).
2. See id. at 1243. For a discussion of the presence of sexual harassment in schools,
see infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
3. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1243.
4. See id John Doe could access this isolated area of the school because he was a
janitor's assistant. See id.
5. See id at 1243-44.
6. See id at 1244. Upon her release from the hospital, Penelope returned to the high
school for only one day because she was assaulted again by John Doe. See id.
7. See id.
& See id. When Ms. Murrell eventually met with the principal, the school official
suggested that the sexual contact was consensual, despite the fact that because of
Penelope's condition, she was legally incapable of consenting to such behavior. See id
9. See id at 1242. Title IX applies to any public or private school, as well as any
vocational, professional, or higher education institution, that receives federal funds, and
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Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education," several lower courts had dismissed
cases based on school liability for peer sexual harassment." The 1999
Supreme Court decision in Davis, however, established that severe
student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment is
actionable under Title IX when coupled with deliberate indifference
by a school official with authority to remedy the conduct. 2 Based on
Davis, Ms. Murrell's claim could go forward.
This Note begins by examining the facts and holding of Davis.13
The Note then offers a brief overview of sexual harassment, Title IX,
Title VII, and the case law leading up to Davis.4 Next, the Note
discusses the shortcomings associated with the Court's decision,
critiquing the standard that the Court chose, 15 and offering
suggestions of how courts and schools might interpret the
requirements set out by the Court.16  Finally, this Note examines
unsettled issues remaining after Davis that will have to be resolved by
future litigants such as the Murrell family. 7
Davis involved a fifth grader, G.F., who harassed fellow
classmate LaShonda Davis frequently during a five-month period. 8
G.F. attempted to touch LaShonda's breasts and genital area and
harassed her with comments such as "'I want to get in bed with
the statute bars recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on sex. See 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). For a thorough discussion of Title IX and its history, see infra notes
91-98 and accompanying text.
10. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
11. See, e.g., Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249 (discussing the lower court's dismissal for
failure to state a claim); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th
Cir. 1997) (en banc) (affirming a district court's dismissal of a peer harassment case
because there was no clear congressional notice to schools that they could be liable for
student-on-student sexual harassment), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999);
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying a school
district's liability for peer sexual harassment). In fact, the district court in Murrell did
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. See Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1249. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, however, holding that Ms. Murrell had proven all
of the requirements necessary to state a Title IX claim as set forth in Davis. See id.
12. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; see also Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1245 (referencing the
Davis Court's establishment of indifference to sexual harassment as an essential element
of a claim for money damages).
13. See infra notes 18-67 and accompanying text.
14. See supra notes 68-136 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 137-64 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 165-89 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 190-201 and accompanying text. This Note is limited in scope to
issues arising in elementary and secondary schools and does not address issues arising in
the higher education setting.
18. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-34. The harassment began in December and continued
through April. See id,
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you'" and "'I want to feel your boobs.' "19 Other incidents of
harassment included G.F. placing a doorstop in his pants, suggestively
approaching LaShonda in gym class, and rubbing his body up against
hers in a sexually suggestive fashion.20  During the alleged
harassment, LaShonda reported G.F.'s conduct to her classroom
teacher, another classroom teacher, the physical education teacher,
and her mother, Aurelia Davis.' Ms. Davis also contacted
LaShonda's teacher, who persuaded her that the principal knew of
G.F.'s behavior. Although at least three teachers and the principal
knew about the harassment, no school official took any disciplinary
action against G.F.23 In fact, LaShonda's classroom teacher waited
three months to grant LaShonda's request to be moved from her
assigned seat, which was next to G.F.24
The harassment clearly affected LaShonda: her grades dropped,
she told her mother she was not sure how much longer she could
defend herself from G.F., and she became suicidalP Presumably
upset by her daughter's suffering, Ms. Davis filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the
principal, the school board, and the district superintendent.26 She
alleged that G.F.'s harassment interfered with LaShonda's access to
education, and that the deliberate indifference of the board created a
hostile environment in violation of Title IX
The district court ruled that the school board's actions were not
sufficient to support a claim under Title IX.28 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
Davis's allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie claim for
19. See id. at 633.
20. See id. at 634.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 633-34. G.F. also allegedly harassed other classmates. See id. at 635.
LaShonda and these other female students asked for a meeting with the principal to
discuss the incidents, but a teacher denied the request. See id. When Aurelia Davis finally
spoke with the principal in mid-May, the principal told her that he would speak to G.F.
more harshly, but no evidence suggests that anyone disciplined G.F. at any time. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 634.
26. See id. at 635. Five months after the harassment began, G.F. pleaded guilty to
sexual battery. See id. The district court dismissed the case against the superintendent
and the principal. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367
(M.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub nom. Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 74 F. 3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996), affd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir.
1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
27. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 636.
28 See Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 367.
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sexual discrimination under Title IX, due to the board's indifference
to the harassment.29 On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the suit, explaining
that, because Title IX was passed as congressional Spending Clause
legislation,3 0 the lack of unambiguous notice of the possible liability
prohibited holding schools accountable under a private cause of
action.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari32 to resolve a conflict
in the circuits as to when a recipient of federal funds can be liable for
damages as a result of student-on-student sexual harassment and
which standards should be utilized in examining such a case.33
The Supreme Court voted five to four that the school district
could be liable for the student-on-student sexual harassment.34 The
Court framed the issue as whether a school district's failure to
29. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11th Cir. 1996),
affd en banc, 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
The Eleventh Circuit panel emphasized that Title VII principles frequently are applied to
Title IX cases. See id. at 1190. For examples of cases applying Title VII principles to Title
IX cases, see infra note 98.
30. The Spending Clause of the Constitution states: "The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 1.
31. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The Supreme Court previously had
held that if Congress places conditions on the recipients of federal funds, it must do so
unambiguously in order for states to make the decision whether to accept the conditions
and, therefore, the federal funds. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1981). The Pennhurst Court analogized Spending Clause legislation to a
contract, explaining that Congress gives money to a state in exchange for state adherence
to certain federal conditions. See id. at 17. For the contract to be fair, states must accept
knowingly and voluntarily the contract terms or conditions, and therefore, Congress must
express clearly its intent as to what the conditions involve. See id. The requirement of
congressional intent often is referred to as "notice," see id. at 24-25 (addressing the
requirement of "clear notice" to states of the conditions on a grant of federal funds), and
should be distinguished from the requirement of actual notice or knowledge set out in the
Davis test, 526 U.S. at 650.
32. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 524 U.S. 980 (1998).
33. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 637-38. Regarding the conflict in the circuits, the Court
compared Davis, 120 F.3d at 1390, and Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District, 80
F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996), two cases holding that the school district was not liable for
peer harassment, with Doe v. University of Illinois, 138 F.3d 653, 668 (7th Cir. 1998), and
Oona R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1998), two cases upholding private
damages under Title IX for peer harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 637-38; see also infra
notes 131-36 and accompanying text (discussing the different approaches taken by lower
courts in analyzing peer harassment claims).
34. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. Justice O'Connor delivered the majority opinion,
joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. See id. Justice Kennedy wrote a
dissent in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. See id. at
654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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respond to reports of peer harassment supports a case for monetary
damages under Title IX.31 In this particular case, the Court
explained, the school district was being held responsible for its own
conduct rather than the conduct of G.F3 6 Resolving the conflict in
lower courts as to what standard should apply to peer harassment
cases, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion invoked a standard similar
to that established in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,37 a 1998 case holding that a fund recipient may be held liable
in a suit for private damages if the recipient intentionally violates
Title IX by showing deliberate indifference to known acts of teacher-
student harassment.3 8 In Davis, the Court concluded that in certain
circumstances the Gebser standard applies to student-on-student
harassment 9
Before expanding on the test to be applied in peer harassment
cases, the Court noted that it had always treated Title IX as Spending
Clause legislation and analyzed the notice issue under that
framework.' The Court noted that in Spending Clause cases, a
funding recipient can only be held liable for an action if the recipient
has adequate notice that the action violates the statute in question.41
According to the Court, the regulatory scheme surrounding Title IX
and the common law gave the school district adequate notice that it
could be held liable for the actions of third parties.42
35. See i- at 639.
36. See id. at 641. The respondent asserted that Aurelia Davis was attempting to hold
the school board liable for G.F.'s actions. See id.
37. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
3& See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641; Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.
39. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. Later in the opinion, the Court elaborated on the
circumstances in which a school district will be held liable. According to the Court, the
funding recipients must be deliberately indifferent to acts of sexual harassment of which
they have actual knowledge and those acts must be so severe, pervasive, and offensive as
to deprive the victim of access to her education. See id. at 650.
40. See id. at 640. Because the Supreme Court had suggested previously that Title IX
was passed according to the Spending Clause, liability under the statute depends on
unambiguous congressional notice of such liability. See supra notes 30-31.
41. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640. The Court noted, however, that a case would not be
barred for lack of notice if the violation of Title IX was intentional. See id. at 642 (citing
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,74 (1992)). For further discussion of
Franklin, see infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
42. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44. In support of its proposition, the Court cited the
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (OCR) requirements that explicitly state
that "a school will be liable under Title IX if its students sexually harass other students if
(i) a hostile environment exists in the school's programs or activities, (ii) the school knows
or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action." Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,039 (1997)
2000] 1577
1578 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78
After Davis, the test to be applied to peer harassment cases
contains three requirements: (1) a school district must have actual
knowledge of sexual harassment; (2) the harassment must be so
severe and pervasive as to deprive its victim of an education; and (3)
the school district must have reacted to that harassment with
deliberate indifference.43 The Court explained that determining
whether the alleged conduct in a given case constitutes severe
harassment involves weighing many factors, including the number of
students involved and the ages of the harasser and victim. 4
[hereinafter OCR Guidelines]. With regard to common-law notice, the Court cited the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which states that
[o]ne who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of
another ... is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct
of third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other ... if
the actor (a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the
conduct of the third persons, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965); see also Davis, 526 U.S. at 644 (citing
§ 320). Later in the opinion, the Court noted that a National School Boards Association
publication had observed that a district might be held liable for peer harassment if it had
actual knowledge of such harassment. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 647 (citing NATIONAL
SCHOOL BDS AsS'N COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ATTORNEYS SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
SCHOOLS: PREVENTING AND DEFENDING AGAINST CLAIMS 45 (rev. ed 1986)).
Whether or not the Court was correct in its finding that the notice requirement was
satisfied, school districts certainly are on notice after Davis that they can be held liable for
peer harassment if the facts of a case support the test articulated by the Court. The dissent
disagreed that the school district had notice of possible peer harassment liability. See id. at
654-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Pennhurst discussed only congressional notice as
sufficient to warn fund recipients of liability. See Pennhurst State Sch. v. Haldeman, 451
U.S. 1, 25 (1981). The Court in Davis, however, relied upon other sources of notice, thus
broadening the definition of what constitutes notice under the Spending Clause. See
Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44 (referencing the Department of Education Guidelines and the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS). The Court explicitly stated that it was not relying
on the publications as an indication of congressional notice, see id. at 647, but the majority
in Davis nonetheless seemed to dismiss the notice problem with no explanation other than
its description of the non-traditional sources. See id at 647-48. The dissent in Davis
correctly noted that "[n]either the [regulatory scheme] nor state tort law... could or did
provide States the notice required by Spending Clause principles." Id. at 669 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). This expansion of notice principles could have far-reaching effects in future
litigation in a variety of areas involving federally funded programs as parties try to
circumvent the notice requirement and hold funding recipients liable for violations
mentioned only briefly in publications or pamphlets, rather than for regulations clearly
explained by Congress and explicitly accepted by the recipients.
43. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. The actual knowledge requirement is sometimes
described as notice to the school district of the harassment. See, e.g., Murray v. New York
Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that N.Y.U. did not
have notice, that is, knowledge, of certain alleged harassment). This concept of
knowledge as notice should be distinguished carefully from the notice of possible liability
required by Spending Clause legislation that is discussed supra notes 30-31.
44. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651. The OCR Guidelines consider the following factors in
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Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Title IX does not provide a
remedy in cases of simple childish behavior and teasing, but is
reserved for those cases in which the harassment is so severe as to
deprive the victims of equal access to education.45
Presumably to allay school administrators' fears that the scope of
Davis would cause a flood of litigation, the Court highlighted some
limitations on liability in peer harassment cases. 46 According to the
Court, both the deliberate indifference standard and the language of
Title IX itself restrict the situations in which a school district can be
held responsible in a peer harassment action.47 The Court viewed the
deliberate indifference standard as narrowing the class of liable
parties because the standard applies only when the fund recipient8
has control over the harassment and has the authority to take
remedial action.49 The statutory language of Title IX further limits
liability because only those who subject students to the harassment
may be held liable and the harassment must occur in an environment
that is under the school board's control.50 Furthermore, the Court
determining whether peer harassment rises to an actionable level: (1) the degree to which
the conduct affected the victim's education; (2) the frequency of the harassment, (3) the
number of harassers and victims involved; (4) the age and sex of both the harasser and the
victim; (5) the size of the school and under what context the harassment occurred; and (6)
whether other incidents involving different students contributed to the hostile
environment. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,041-42.
45. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651-52; see also infra notes 167-75 and accompanying text
(discussing the difficulty in defining actionable harassment).
46. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53. In fact, the actual knowledge standard greatly
limited the protections afforded schoolchildren. See infra notes 145-63 and accompanying
text.
47. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53.
48. Title IX applies only to those educational programs that receive federal funds.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
49. See id. One commentator has emphasized the difficulties in applying this
standard. See Cynthia Gorney, Teaching Johnny the Appropriate Way to Flirt, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 1999, § 6 (Magazine) at 43 (predicting a flood of lawsuits "as school
officials scramble to figure out what 'deliberate indifference' means" (quoting 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681(a), 1687 (1994))). In an earlier case before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
Judge Posner in dissent endorsed a deliberate indifference standard. See Doe v.
University of ll., 138 F.3d 653, 680 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner
reasoned that a negligence standard would give schools insufficient protection and that a
hybrid standard requiring actual knowledge and a failure of a school to respond promptly
would be unworkable unless it was defined clearly. See id. at 679-80 (Posner, J.,
dissenting). He preferred a deliberate indifference standard, judging it to be a simpler,
more workable alternative. See id. at 680 (Posner, J., dissenting).
50. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53 (explaining that the scope of Title IX is limited
because a recipient only can be liable for harassment that occurs "'under' 'the operations
of' a funding recipient," that is, in an environment that the funding recipient controls
(quoting 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), 1687 (1994))). The Court explained that, in addition to
direct harassment by the school district, the district could also subject students to
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emphasized that the standard does not require school districts to take
any particular action or even to be successful in ending the
harassment.5' Rather, Davis simply requires administrators who have
actual knowledge of the harassment to respond in a reasonable
manner.
5 2
The Court acknowledged that cases involving peer harassment
are far less likely to survive these standards than cases involving
teacher harassment of students. In Aurelia Davis's case, however,
the Court recognized that the facts might be sufficient to satisfy the
elements required to sustain a claim for peer harassment against the
school district.' Consequently, the Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.55
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion found the Court's
treatment of federalism and congressional Spending Clause
legislation problematic. 6 In addition, the dissent argued that the
indifference standard articulated by the Court was inadequate
because the standard offered no definition of actionable harassment
and no explanation as to who must have actual knowledge of the
harassment. 7 With regard to federalism, Justice Kennedy argued that
if unchecked, Congress could erase the distinctions between federal
and state domains through the use of its Spending Clause power.58
The notice requirement, according to the dissent, is a vital safeguard
against such federal intrusion on local spheres because it enables
harassment by its deliberate indifference, which has the effect of making student victims
vulnerable to continued peer harassment. See id.
51. See id. at 648-49. One commentator has explained that a bona fide remedial
action will suffice to satisfy this requirement. See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Student to Student
Sexual Harassment: Which Tack Will the Supreme Court Take in a Sea of Analyses?, 132
EDUC. L. REP. 609, 612 (1999). In Doe v. University of Illinois, Judge Posner suggested
that to be deliberately indifferent a school would have to do nothing or react in a manner
that it knew would be ineffectual. Doe, 138 F.3d at 680 (Posner, J., dissenting).
52. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648-49; see also infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text
(discussing the deliberate indifference standard).
53. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653.
54. See id. at 654. The Court reached this decision because the petitioner's complaint
had alleged all the elements of the offense: (1) harassment that had a negative effect on
LaShonda's access to education; (2) deliberate indifference; and (3) actual knowledge of
the harassment by the school district. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 654-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. See iL at 672-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 654-55 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress could
aggrandize its power outside what Article I of the Constitution allows by attaching
conditions to federal funds and therefore controlling local domains by setting policy at a
federal level).
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states to police federal regulations. 9 The dissent suggested that in
order to stay true to Spending Clause principles and check
unconstrained congressional power, the Court in Davis should have
required a demonstration that Congress gave funding recipients clear
and unambiguous notice of liability for failure to remedy peer
harassment.60 Justice Kennedy disagreed with the majority's position
that either the Department of Education regulations or a National
School Boards Association publication satisfied the notice required
by Spending Clause principles.6'
Justice Kennedy also found the majority's articulation of a
standard of liability to be inadequate, as it offered no guidance in
recognizing instances of actionable harassment.' He questioned the
appropriateness of labeling immature behavior as gender
discrimination, arguing that an analogy to Title VII workplace
standards was inapplicable because "schools are not workplaces and
children are not adults." 6 The dissent argued that the Court's views
on the amount of control that a school possesses over students are
impractical because that control is "complicated and limited," in
contrast to the control a school has over its teachers, who have
employment contracts with the school.64 In further support of his
argument, Justice Kennedy noted that federal constitutional
constraints require schools to give notice and a hearing before
59. See id at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). After concluding her announcement of
the decision for the Court, Justice O'Connor addressed the dissenters' federalism
argument by asserting that, instead of the dissent's view that the decision would "'teach
little Johnny a perverse lesson in Federalism,'" Davis "'assures that little Mary may
attend class.'" Linda Greenhouse, Sex Harassment in Class Ruled Schools' Liability, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25,1999, at Al (quoting Justice O'Connor).
60. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Court's
failure to provide a clear rule as to notice as "neither sensible nor faithful to Spending
Clause principles").
61. See id at 669-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. See icL at 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 165-89 and
accompanying text (discussing difficulties resulting from the Court's standard).
63. Davis, 526 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Id at 664 (Kennedy, 3., dissenting). The dissent noted that a school's disciplinary
authority over students is limited by due process requirements of notice and a hearing in
suspension cases and by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which limits the
actions that schools can take to discipline students with behavior disorder disabilities. See
id. at 665-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also pointed out that public schools
have no control in choosing the students who attend their schools, as no screening
processes exist. See id at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Compare id (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting a school's inability to choose its students), with infra note 157 and
accompanying text (noting the inability of children to change to a different school when
faced with harassment).
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suspending a student.'
Additionally, the dissent viewed the majority's test as too broad
and predicted that such an expansive test would invite courts into the
classroom to police conduct, resulting in endless peer-harassment
litigation.66 In contrast to the majority, Justice Kennedy would have
recognized that only a pattern of discriminatory behavior by a school
in response to harassment could be actionable, for example, if a
school failed to discipline boys for harassing girls "on a widespread
level, day after day."'67 In sum, the dissent thought that the majority
failed to follow Spending Clause principles and failed to provide
funding recipients with adequate guidance in understanding the
standard articulated.
Although the Court in Davis did not define sexual harassment, 6
that term was first explained as discrimination on the basis of sex in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.69 The Meritor Court accepted
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
definition of sexual harassment as including two categories of
behavior: quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment
harassment. 70 The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), the body that enforces Title IX,71 includes these two types of
65. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 155-57
and accompanying text (discussing the control exercised by school officials).
66. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 677-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted
that Title IX places no limit on damages. See id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 683 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
68. See id at 677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting the Court's "inability to provide
any workable definition of actionable peer harassment").
69. 477 U.S. 57,63 (1986).
70. See id. at 65. Sexual harassment in the workplace is defined as "[u]nwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature," when: (1) a person's employment is conditioned on submitting to such
conduct; (2) employment decisions affecting the victim of the conduct are based on
submission to or rejection of the sexual conduct; or (3) the conduct subjects the victim to
an offensive and hostile working environment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999). In two
recent cases, the Supreme Court has erased the distinction between liability for quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment as applied to harassment of an employee
by a supervisor, thereby mandating absolute liability of employers for both types. See
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-08 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761-65 (1998); Paul E. Starkman, Learning the New Rules of Sexual
Harassment: Faragher, Ellerth, and Beyond, 66 DEF. CouNs. J. 317, 318 (1999); see also
Rosalind S. Fink, Overview of Sexual Harassment Law, in HOW TO HANDLE YOUR FIRST
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE 7, 14-15 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 386, 1999) (discussing categories of sexual harassment after these
two cases).
71. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.1-.71 (1996)
(setting forth OCR regulations under Title IX).
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sexual harassment in its guidelines. 72 Under OCR Guidelines, quid
pro quo harassment occurs when a school employee conditions a
student's access to educational opportunities on the student's
compliance with unwelcome sexual conduct, which includes requests
for sexual favors and other verbal or nonverbal sexual conduct.73
Hostile environment sexual harassment also includes unwelcome
sexual overtures, demands for sexual favors, and other verbal and
non-verbal sexual conduct, but it occurs when sexual harassment by
an employee, student, or third party is sufficiently severe to create a
hostile educational environment or to interfere with a victim's access
to education. 4  This type of sexual harassment occurs more
frequently and, yet, is more misunderstood than quid pro quo
harassment75 because it is more difficult to recognize.76
Although sexual harassment among adults may be well
publicized, harassment among children is equally prevalent. Peer
sexual harassment, or student-on-student sexual harassment, has been
described as "the most rapidly emerging, controversial, and
potentially volatile issue of sexual harassment."'77 Courts frequently
have encountered difficulty in defining student-on-student sexual
harassment and in evaluating the harm and liability in such cases
because of students' immaturity 8  This difficulty in considering
72. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,038.
73. See id.
74. See id; see also AUDREY COHAN ET AL., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL
ABUSE: A HANDBOOK FOR TEACHERS AND ADMINISTRATORS 6 (1996) (defining a
hostile environment as an atmosphere so offensive that it "interferes with an individual's
ability to work or with a student's ability to learn or to participate in learning activities in
and around the school environment"). This Note focuses on hostile environment sexual
harassment, the type of harassment that was involved in Davis. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650
(noting that for harassment to be actionable it must be so severe as to interfere with a
victim's access to education).
75. See ROBERT J. SHOOP & DEBRA L. EDWARDs, How TO STOP SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS: A HANDBOOK AND CURRICULUM GUIDE FOR
ADMINISTRATORS AND TEACHERS 20 (1994).
76. See COHAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 7 (attributing the difficulty in recognizing
hostile environment behavior to the use of a "boys will be boys" rationale as justification
for the harassment). Other commentators aptly point out that the difficulty schools are
having mirrors the confusion in the courts. See Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake,
When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss: Title IX and Student-to-Student Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 423,424 (1997).
77. Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-
on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205,
206 (1999).
7& See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 71; Dennie D. Butterfield, Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment and Discrimination, B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J., Spring 1995, at 21,
21-22, 38. Peer harassment has not been recognized as widely as workplace harassment
due to the lack of documentation and attention. See John T. Wolohan, Sexual Harassment
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sexual harassment in the context of small children is illustrated by one
commentator's suggestion that small children are incapable of sexual
harassment because, at young ages, children are essentially asexual 9
Regardless of the age of the harasser, however, uninvited
sexually based behavior is unwelcome.80 A national survey of
students in the eighth through eleventh grades found that 80% of
students in those grades acknowledged being sexually harassed at
school."' The survey found that 85% of girls and 76% of boys
considered themselves subjected to unwelcome sexual propositions
that disrupted their lives. 82 Of those harassed, 79% had been
subjected to peer harassment.81 These statistics are illustrative of the
fact that sexual harassment occurs often in elementary and secondary
schools, as boys grab and proposition girls."' The psychological
effects of harassment are serious, including hopelessness and low self-
esteem,8 embarrassment, humiliation, isolation, withdrawal,
of Students by Students: Do School Administrators Have an Affirmative Duty to Prevent
Such Conduct?, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 889, 889 (1995). As a consequence of courts' greater
recognition of workplace harassment, employers have strong motivation to create
procedures and policies to combat harassment because they are legally liable if they
"knew or should have known" of harassment, but school districts have not had such
motivation because, until Davis, they did not know which liability standard would be
applied to peer harassment. See Andrea Giampetro-Meyer et al., Sexual Harassment in
Schools: An Analysis of the "Knew or Should Have Known" Liability Standard in the Title
IXPeer Sexual Harassment Cases, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ. 301,301 (1997).
79. See G.D. Gearino, Mensch Behaving Badly, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Sept. 27, 1996, at D1; see also John Leland, A Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21,
1996, at 71, 72 (noting that some child-development experts disagree as to whether certain
conduct by young children should be labeled as sexual harassment).
80. See First-Grader Must Remember This: A Kiss Is More Than Just a Kiss, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 25, 1996, at A3 (quoting a school spokeswoman); see
also Fink, supra note 70, at 19-20 (stating that the effect of the behavior on the victim, not
the intent of the harasser, determines liability for sexual harassment).
81. See AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS:
THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 7 (1993)
[hereinafter HOSTILE HALLWAYS]. Conducted in February and March of 1993, the
survey reported results from 1632 students, grades eight through eleven, in 79 U.S.
schools. See id at 5.
82. See id. at 7.
83. See id at 11.
84. See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 55. The authors describe harassment
in schools as having reached "epidemic proportions." Id. In addition to these studies,
being a school-age child is increasingly difficult, due not only to the increase in weapons
and violence in schools but also to the sexually explicit material directed at children by
television, music, video games, movies, advertising, and the internet. See Gorney, supra
note 49, at 43.
85. See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 62 (noting that students who are
victims of harassment experience a change in attitude about school and themselves as well
as feelings of hopelessness and low self-esteem); see also Butterfield, supra note 78, at 23
(noting the danger and long-lasting effects of a damaged self-image).
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personality changes, 6 and a desire to miss school or to stay silent in
classy Physical symptoms can include headaches and ulcers.88 The
evidence presented in these studies overwhelmingly establishes the
prevalence of peer harassment in schools.8 9
Because peer harassment is such a pervasive problem in schools,
children need an avenue through which to stop peer harassment and
to hold those responsible for the harassment accountable for their
actions, or, in some cases, for their inaction. 0 One such avenue exists
in the form of Title IX, which prohibits federal funding recipients
from discriminating against or depriving a person of education
because of that person's sex.91  Congress enacted Title IX to
accomplish two main goals: to avoid using federal funds to support
those involved in discriminatory practices and to give women
adequate protection against discrimination.92
Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act93 and designed it to fill a void between Title VI and Title
VII.94 Title VI prohibits an institutional recipient of federal funds
from discriminating based on race or national origin, 95 and Title VII
prohibits an employer's act of discrimination based on sex. 6 Title IX
fills the gap by making it unlawful for an educational institution
receiving federal funds to discriminate based on sexy7 When courts
86. See COHAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 61; HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 81, at
16-17.
87. See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 81, at 15.
88. See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 63.
89. See id. at 55; see also HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 81, at 22 (noting that peer
harassment is widespread).
90. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1999).
91. See id. The statute reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id
92. Senator Bayh, the bill's sponsor, stated during the congressional debate that
"[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which I believe is needed if we are to
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later
careers." 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Williams &
Brake, supra note 76, at 432-33 (noting the dual purposes of Title IX).
93. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (noting that Title
IX was patterned after Title VI). During the congressional debate, Senator Bayh
recognized that the language in Title IX was "specifically taken from Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act." 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971).
94. See 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh); Emmalena K.
Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual Harassment and
the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1021 (1998).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1994).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
97. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1999). Congress specifically noted that Title VII excludes
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interpret Title IX, they frequently look to Title VII case law both
because the legislative history suggests such an analogy and because
the Supreme Court has established a link between the two statutes. 98
Title VII's 9 prohibition on sex discrimination by an employer
includes hostile environment sexual harassment that unreasonably
disrupts an individual's performance or creates a hostile or offensive
environment.1'0 The Supreme Court first recognized a claim for
hostile environment harassment in the workplace in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson.' In Meritor, the Court stated that "when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of
sex," thereby recognizing sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination." 2 The Court then rejected the notion that, for
harassment to be actionable, the victim must be deprived of some
tangible aspect of employment, by acknowledging that harassment
may be based on a psychological atmosphere created by the abuse."'
In defining sexual harassment, the Court gave great deference to the
EEOC's Guidelines, which recognized sexual harassment that creates
education. See H.R. REP. No. 92-554, at 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2462,
2463.
98. See 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasizing that Title
IX would extend to education Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in the
workplace); see also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992) (using
Title VII principles to decide a Title IX case); supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text
(discussing Franklin in more depth). Additionally, the Office of Civil Rights has
interpreted Title IX as consistent with Title VII. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at
12,034 (stating that the OCR's policy regarding claims under Title IX is consistent with
Title IX principles and with "related anti-discrimination provisions of Title VI and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). For examples of cases applying Title VII principles,
see Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1998); Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988); Mabry v. State Board of Community Colleges and
Occupational Education, 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Thomas M.
Melsheimer et al., The Law of Sexual Harassment on Campus: A Work in Progress, 13
REV. LrIG. 529, 532 (1994) (stating that Title VII law guides courts in their interpretation
of Title IX); Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII Happy Together as a Resolution to
Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 703 (1995) (same).
Miller argues that even looking to Title VI to interpret Title IX cases will "springboard"
courts into applying Title VII standards. Miller, supra, at 725.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(a)(1).
100. See 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)(3) (2000); Meritor Savs. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57,65 (1986).
101. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (stating that "a claim of 'hostile environment' sex
discrimination is actionable under Title VII"). The plaintiff in Meritor was a bank teller
who claimed that during a four-year period her supervisor frequently subjected her to
sexual harassment. See id. at 59-61. The alleged harassment included compelling her to
have sexual relations and forcibly raping her several times. See id. at 60.
102 Id at 64.
103. See id.
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an intimidating and hostile atmosphere in the workplace as a form of
employment discrimination.104  The Court did qualify hostile
environment sexual harassment, however, by holding that plaintiffs
cannot recover unless it is so "severe or pervasive" as to create an
intimidating environment. 15
Although the Court in Meritor recognized a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim, it did not articulate a standard of employer
liability for such claims.16 The Court acknowledged that agency
principles should be applied in Title VII cases, but rejected the
argument that Congress intended employers automatically to be
liable for the behavior of their supervisors 17  Thus, the task was left
to future courts to decide what standard of liability should be applied
in these cases and what behavior constitutes "severe and pervasive
harassment."'108
Since Meritor, the Court has agreed on the standard of liability
for employers under Title VII, holding that in a claim for hostile
environment sexual harassment, an employer may be vicariously
liable 9 for harassment by a supervisor."0  Harassment between
104. See id. at 65. The court noted that, although agency guidelines are not binding on
courts, they represent experience and judgment on which both courts and litigants should
rely. See id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)). The EEOC
Guidelines include sexual conduct "creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment" in the definition of sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1999).
105. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. Compare id (requiring severe or pervasive harassment
for a hostile environment sexual harassment action in the employment context), with
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (providing that harassment must be severe and pervasive to be
actionable). The Meritor Court found the allegations adequate to state a claim. See
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
106. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72; see also Rebecca Hanner White, There's Nothing
Special About Sex: The Supreme Court Mainstreams Sexual Harassment, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 725, 727 (1999) (recognizing that Meritor left the standard of liability for
sexual harassment unresolved).
107. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
108. White, supra note 106, at 727. Professor White describes the issues that remained
unanswered after Meritor as: what constitutes employer liability; what circumstances rise
to severe and pervasive harassment; whether such behavior is judged from a subjective or
objective standard; and whether a victim needs to establish psychological harm. See id; see
also Starkman, supra note 70, at 318 (noting that courts continue to wrestle with the issue
of what constitutes actionable harassment).
109. Under a Title VII respondeat superior or vicarious liability theory, an employer is
liable for intentional acts of an employee that are committed in furtherance of the
employment relationship. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th
Cir. 1986).
110. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). These two cases also set out an affirmative
defense, which is available if: (1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct the harassment; and (2) the plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize the employer's
complaint procedures or policies. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765;
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employees carries a different standard of liability. In such cases, an
employer will be liable for conduct that is sufficiently severe and
pervasive to interfere with a victim's work environment if the
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt remedial action."' The Court in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc."' laid out several factors to be considered in deciding
whether conduct constitutes severe and pervasive harassment,
including whether an objective reasonable person would find the
harassment offensive and whether the victim finds the conduct
interferes with her working environment."'
Case law regarding Title IX has departed in some significant
ways from case law dealing with sexual harassment in the
employment context. While courts addressing Title VII issues were
struggling to define employer liability, courts facing Title IX disputes
were defining the scope of that statute and attempting to articulate
the principles that should be applied in education cases."4 The first
major step in defining Title IX standards came from Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Schools,"5 in which the Supreme Court
established that sexual harassment constitutes discrimination based
Starkman, supra note 70, at 328.
111. See Hall v. Gus, 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 28
(D. Neb. 1983) (mem.), affd, 726 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984); Ferguson v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours and Co., 560 F. Supp 1172, 1198-99 (D. Del. 1983); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d) (1999) (suggesting that an employer will be liable for harassment between
employees when it knew or should have known of the behavior); FRANcIs ACHAMPONG,
WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 47-49 (1999) (discussing a constructive notice
standard in negligence cases in the employment context); Fink, supra note 70, at 17
(discussing liability for actions between co-workers and third parties); Williams & Brake,
supra note 76, at 454 (explaining that the "knew-or-should-have-known" standard applies
in the employment context).
112. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
113. See id. at 21-23. Harris denotes the Court's willingness to expand the scope of
hostile environment sexual harassment, as the Court recognized that harassment that is
intangible is nonetheless serious. See Miller, supra note 98, at 705.
114. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (defining the
test for teacher-student sexual harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503
U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (recognizing that sexual harassment amounts to discrimination based on
sex under Title IX); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (holding
that Title IX includes an implied private right of action).
115. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). The petitioner in Franklin alleged that her teacher sexually
harassed her by forcibly kissing her and eventually forcing her to have intercourse. See id.
at 63. She further alleged that teachers and school administrators knew of the harassment
and took no action to halt the teacher's behavior. See id. at 63-64. These facts are similar
to the facts in Davis, except that Franklin dealt with teacher-student harassment, while
Davis dealt with student-on-student harassment. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying
text (discussing the facts in Davis).
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on sex under Title IX.116 This endorsement of Title VII principles
established a Supreme Court-approved link between Title IX and
Title VII and led some lower courts to begin applying workplace
harassment standards to Title IX cases.117 This "clear authority for
courts to consult Title VII principles when addressing Title IX sexual
harassment claims" assisted courts because judges have experience
with Title VII standards that can be used in addressing educational
harassment issues, in contrast to the undefined Title IX standards.118
116. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75. The Court reasoned that because Meritor states that
a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate constitutes discrimination based on sex,
the same rule should apply to a teacher's sexual harassment of a student. See id. (citing
Meritor Says. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). For a discussion of Meritor,
see supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
117. See Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1998); Murray v. New York
Univ. College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch.
Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1995); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1288, 1290-93 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The court in Oona pointed out that Franklin
analogized Title IX duties to those of Title VII, leaving the door open for subsequent
courts to apply such analogies even where they could not before. See Oona, 143 F.3d at
476; see also Kathy Lee Collins, Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment Under Title IX: The
Legal and Practical Issues, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 789, 795 (1998) (noting that some lower
courts saw this reference to Meritor as rationalizing the application of Title VII principles
to Title IX cases); Charles J. Russo et al., Sexual Harassment and Student Rights: The
Supreme Court Expands Title IX Remedies, 75 EDUC. L. REP., 733, 739 (1992) (arguing
that the analogy to Meritor finding sexual harassment constitutes sexual discrimination is
the most important aspect of Franklin); supra note 98 (listing cases applying Title VII
principles). The Court in Murray noted that the Court's citation of Meritor in Franklin
supported an inference that Title IX cases could be analyzed similarly to Title VII cases.
See Murray, 57 F.3d at 249. Similarly, the Petaluma Court noted that although the
defendant in the case had no notice of a duty imposed under Title IX and therefore could
not be held liable, in the future Title VII cases might be used by analogy to establish such
a duty under Title IX. See Petaluma, 54 F.3d at 1452. The Patricia H. court looked to
Meritor in analyzing the plaintiff's hostile environment claim, noting that the Supreme
Court in Franklin did so as well. See Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1292. Judges have
disagreed as to how far the Court's approval of Title VII principles should reach, with
some arguing that the use of the principles in Franklin mandated an analogy to Title VII in
all situations, see Oona, 143 F.3d at 476-77, and others asserting that the analogy was
meant to apply only to teacher-student sexual harassment, see id. at 479 (Hall, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting Franklin as approving the application of Title VII analogies in
teacher-on-student harassment cases only); see also Russo et al., supra, at 740 (noting that
Franklin did not define the scope of the application of Meritor principles to Title IX
cases). In addition to establishing a link between Title VII and Title IX, Franklin
motivated schools to curb harassment, see MARJORIE FINK, ADOLESCENT SEXUAL
ASSAULT & HARASSMENT PREVENTION CURRICULUM 24 (1995) (maintaining that
Franklin decision motivated school districts to develop policies to combat sexual
harassment), and spawned litigation, see Ellen J. Vargyas, Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools and Its Impact in Title IX Enforcement, 19 J.C. & U.L. 373, 383 (1993)
(arguing that Franklin "provided an important new tool to eradicate the pernicious and
stubborn problem of sex discrimination from our nation's schools").
118. Williams & Brake, supra note 76, at 442. Some commentators discussed the
implications of the Court's holding in Franklin, noting that the direct application of the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Additionally, in Franklin the Court explored the remedies available
to a plaintiff suing under Title X" and asked whether Congress had
intended to limit those remedies.120 In Cannon v. University of
Chicago,2' the Court previously had established that Title IX includes
an implied private right of action." In concluding that Congress did
not intend to limit the available remedies, the Court noted that if
Congress had disapproved of the implied cause of action, it could
have limited damages in conjunction with several amendments passed
after Cannon.' 3 Thus, the Court found that monetary damages are
an available remedy under Title IX.'
After Franklin, the Court developed a more detailed standard
Meritor ruling leads to questions of whether the Court would apply all Meritor rules in the
school setting or whether Franklin is meant to be a more limited holding. See Russo et al.,
supra note 117, at 740. According to Russo, the language of Franklin could be interpreted
either way.
119. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65. Franklin is perhaps more important as a remedies
case than as a case dealing with sexual harassment law. See Russo et al., supra note 117, at
740. But see Vargyas, supra note 117, at 373 (noting that the court in Franklin provided an
important tool to deal with sex discrimination in schools).
120. See Franklin, 503 U.S at 71.
121. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
122 See id at 717; see also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-72 (discussing Cannon). The
petitioner in Cannon did not bring suit based on harassment as the petitioner in Davis did
but rather based her claim on sex discrimination, alleging that she was rejected from
medical school because of her sex. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680-81. In determining that a
private right of action was appropriate, the Court analyzed Title IX under a four-factor
test, examining: (1) whether the statute was designed to benefit the class to which the
plaintiff belonged; (2) whether the legislative history pointed to congressional intent to
include an implied remedy; (3) whether implying such an action would contravene the
statute; and (4) whether an implied remedy would encroach on an area of law typically
regulated by the states. See id, at 688-709.
123. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72. In support of its theory, the Court referenced two
amendments enacted after Cannon: the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1986 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 716, 717, 794d, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994)), and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1687, 1688 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-4(a) (1994)). See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72-73. The Court reasoned that, because
the Rehabilitation Act Amendments abrogated states' immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment with regard to Title IX, Congress must have intended to validate the holding
in Cannon. See id. at 72. The Civil Rights Restoration Act, according to the Court, lent
further support to the contention that Congress agreed with the decision in Cannon
because the Act did not restrict the right of action implied in Title IX, even though the
Act sought to correct a judicial holding in another case. See id. at 73 (referencing
Congress's use of legislation to correct what it saw as an "unacceptable decision" by the
Court in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,563 (1984)).
124. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76. One group of commentators emphasized the
importance of this holding, noting that the right to monetary damages will allow more
plaintiffs access to a jury trial and result in more recoveries against school districts. See
David S. Tatel et al., The 1991-92 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Impact
on Public Schools, 78 EDUC. L. REP. 3, 15 (1992).
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for school system liability and moved away from applying Title VII
principles in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District.25 In
Gebser, the Court determined the circumstances under which a school
district would face Title IX liability for a teacher's harassment of a
student. 26 The Court concluded that damages would only be
available if: (1) a school district official had the authority to take
action; (2) the official had actual notice of the harassment; and (3) the
official responded with deliberate indifference.27
The petitioners in Gebser argued that standards used in judging
Title VII cases, particularly respondeat superior and constructive
notice principles, should apply to Title IX cases as weil.'2 Because
the Court saw no congressional intent to allow liability based on
respondeat superior or constructive notice principles, however, it was
not willing to imply such far-reaching liability. 29 Examining the
purposes of the statute and the regulatory scheme set up to enforce it,
the Court concluded that a district will be liable only when an
''appropriate person," one who has the authority to take action to end
the harassment, has actual notice of the discrimination and reacts
with deliberate indifference. 30
125. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). The petitioner in Gebser was an eighth-grade student whose
book club leader made sexually suggestive comments and kissed, fondled, and had
intercourse with her. See id. at 277-78. The petitioner did not report the incidents, but
parents of two other students had reported the teacher's sexually suggestive comments to
the principal. See id. at 278. The lower court granted summary judgment for the school
district and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Se id. at 279.
126. See idL at 277.
127. See id. Gebser restricted what had been an expanding view of the scope of Title
IX liability under Cannon and Franklin. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil
Rights Without Civil Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title
IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 755, 780 (1999); see also Fink, supra note 70, at 21
(stating that the Supreme Court in Gebser "severely curtailed" liability for harassment of
students by teachers); cf Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (choosing a similar standard and therefore
curtailing liability for peer harassment as well).
128. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282. The petitioners relied on the Franklin Court's
citation of Meritor as establishing a basis for using Title VII principles as guidance in Title
IX cases. See id. Meritor mandated courts' use of common law agency principles in
examining a case of employer liability for a supervisor's harassment of a subordinate. See
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,72 (1986). Application of a respondeat
superior theory to a Title IX case would impute knowledge to a school district whenever a
teacher's authority over a student aided in the harassment, regardless of whether the
school district had actual knowledge of the harassment. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1984 App.) (discussing an employer's
automatic liability for a supervisor's actions if the supervisor accomplished the harassment
with the aid of the employment relationship).
129. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287-88.
130. Id. at 285-91. Ironically, the Gebser standard was handed down during the same
term that the Court articulated the vicarious liability standard for acts of supervisors in the
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Although the Gebser Court defined the test for teacher-student
harassment, the Court had not addressed a standard to be used in
peer harassment cases prior to Davis. Lower courts differed in their
approaches to the problem of which standard to use in assessing peer
harassment cases.3 1 The different methods applied in lower courts 132
included holdings that: (1) a school district could not be held liable
for peer harassment; 33 (2) a district could be liable only for direct
sexual discrimination by the school district;"3 and (3) a district's
liability would be evaluated under Title VII principles. 35 Because
employment context, sending "two wholly irreconcilable messages." James S. Rosenfeld,
Sex Harassment Decisions: Take Your Statute as You Find It!, 77 MICH. B.J. 1098, 1098
(1998). Mr. Rosenfeld further questioned the anomaly of the inconsistent decisions: "Do
we really want it to be the case that children have a more difficult time suing for
harassment by their teachers than employees have suing for harassment by their
employers?" Id.
131. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing the standard articulated
in Gebser).
132. See Williams & Brake, supra note 76, at 424-25 (discussing the varied liability
standards in the lower courts).
133. See Davis v, Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir, 1997)
(en banc), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, flatly held that a school district could not be liable for student-
on-student sexual harassment under Title IX because the requisite congressional notice
was not present. See id. at 1406. The circuit court's dissent raised an interesting rejoinder
to this argument by pointing out that the cause of action upheld in Franklin also was not
mentioned in legislative history, but that surely the majority did not appear to question its
existence. See id. at 1414 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Circuit declined to use
Title VII principles in analyzing the Title IX case, arguing that: (1) Title VII was worded
differently than Title IX and therefore should be treated differently; (2) Title VII was
enacted under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment and not under the
Spending Clause; and (3) Title VII depends on agency principles that should not be
applied to these facts. See idt at 1399 n.13.
134. See, e.g., Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that liability would not exist under Title IX unless evidence showed that the
school district itself had discriminated sexually against the plaintiff). Rowinsky involved
the harassment of two eighth-grade girls by several boys on the bus to school and in the
classroom. See id. The girls and their parents reported the harassment several times to
the school bus driver, the school's principal, and the school district superintendent, but the
only punishment that the alleged harassers received was a three-day suspension from
riding the bus. See id. Rowinsky argued that discrimination under the statute included the
school district's liability for "hostile environment" sexual harassment, an argument that
the court rejected because it did not believe that principles from the adult employment
context should be applicable to Title IX cases. See id. at 1011 n.11. According to the
Rowinsky court, a plaintiff must show that the school district itself responded differently
to complaints of harassment made by boys than it responded to those made by girls. See
id. at 1016.
135. See Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 476 (9th Cir. 1998). In Oona, the plaintiff
sued under Title IX alleging liability for the failure to remedy two types of harassment,
that by a teacher and that by other classmates. See id at 474. The complaint alleged that a
student-teacher fondled, kissed, and engaged in inappropriate conduct with the plaintiff,
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lower courts remained divided as to which principles to follow, the
Supreme Court in Davis delivered a much-needed standard for
assessing school district liability.136
The Court in Davis purported to settle the question of school
district liability in peer harassment cases by imposing a standard
requiring actual knowledge of and indifference to sexual harassment
that is sufficiently severe and pervasive to deprive a victim of
educational opportunities. 137 At least one element of this standard
appears similar to that applied in employment sexual harassment
cases recognizing a hostile environment, peer harassment cause of
action;38 the requirement that a plaintiff prove harassment
sufficiently severe and pervasive to interfere with a victim's access to
education parallels the language used in Meitor hostile workplace
analysis. 39
sometimes in front of a tenured teacher and principal, and that some male students called
the plaintiff names, hit her in the face, and told her to "[g]et used to it." Id at 475. When
her parents complained about these incidents to the principal and the Director of
Elementary Education, a teacher responded by lowering the plaintiffs grade and
withholding awards from her. See id The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the case must be
analyzed in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin, which analogized
Title IX to Title VII. See id at 476-77 (noting that the Franklin Court's rationale that the
duty arising from Meritor prohibiting a supervisor from harassing a subordinate should
also prohibit a teacher from sexually harassing a student).
By referencing Meritor, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court in
Franklin must have implicitly approved of applying hostile environment sexual harassment
principles to Title IX claims. See Oona, 143 F.3d at 476. The court also referred to courts
in other districts that had used Title VII principles in deciding Title IX cases. See id. at
476-77 (citing Doe v. University of MI1., 138 F.3d 653, 661-62 (7th Cir. 1998); Brzonkala v.
Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 132 F.3d 949, 957 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. granted by
United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999); Doe v. Clairborne County, 103 F.3d 495,
514-15 (6th Cir. 1996); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463,469 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The court therefore asserted that Title VII standards should apply to Oona's case, see id
at 477, and affirmed the district court's decision denying the school officials qualifiedimmunity, see id at 478. Judge Hall wrote a separate opinion, reasoning that Franklin was
not meant to have such a sweeping effect but rather was meant to approve of applying
Title VII standards only to cases of teacher-student harassment. See id. at 479 (Hall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 314; Miller, supra note 99, at 725;
Sullivan, supra note 51, at 627; David P. Thompson & A'Lann Truelock, Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment: Sifting Through the Wreckage, 125 EDUC. L. REP. 1035, 1035
(1998). Thompson and Truelock saw the confusion in appellate courts as two-fold. See
Thompson & Truelock, supra, at 1048. Courts disagreed as to whether Title IX included a
remedy for peer harassment at all and, if it did, they disagreed as to what standard should
be applied in analyzing such a case. See id
137. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
138. See id. (referring to harassment that is sufficiently severe to interfere with the
victim's educational environment). Cf Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (recognizing a hostile
environment cause of action for workplace harassment).
139. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (articulating a test that focused on Meritor terms such
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The standard articulated by the Davis Court, however, was
essentially the Gebser standard,140 and was thus a rejection of the
application of Title VII principles to Title IX cases. Arguably, the
Court could have chosen to view Franklin as endorsing the use of
Title VII principles' 41 and could have applied a more plaintiff-
friendly, constructive notice standard. 2 Moreover, because Congress
mandated that Title IX be given "a sweep as broad as its language' ' 43
and intended to combat sexual discrimination in the classroom,1 44 the
Court's decision in Davis arguably contravened the purpose of Title
IX as well as the spirit of Franklin. From a legal perspective, the
Court in Davis could have applied Title VII standards, thus
articulating a constructive knowledge standard that would have
afforded students the full legal protection from discrimination that
Congress had envisioned.
From a policy perspective, the application of Title VII standards
to Title IX cases would aid student victims of harassment. 145 As the
dissent in Davis pointed out, however, "schools are not workplaces
and children are not adults."'" Some may find it uncomfortable to
hold children to the same standards as those to which adults are
held,147 but children at school should receive at least as much
protection from harassment as do adults in the workplace.14 8 In cases
as severe and pervasive, and on whether the harassment deprived access to educational
opportunities).
140. See id. at 650; Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998).
141. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (reviewing those courts that applied
Title VII principles based on Franklin's citation of Meritor); see also Williams & Brake,
supra note 76 at 442-43 (arguing that Franklin gave courts the "clear authority" to apply
Title VII principles to Title IX cases).
142. See infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text (discussing the merits of a
constructive notice standard in cases involving students).
143. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,564 (1984).
144. See supra note 92.
145. See Sullivan, supra note 51, at 626 (classifying a constructive notice standard and a
response standard approaching negligence as beneficial to students). Additionally,
curbing sexual harassment at an early age will have a positive effect on those children
when they grow up and enter the workplace. See Lisa M. Kelsey, Note, Kids with the
Kisses and Schools with the Jitters: Finding a Reasonable Solution to the Problem of
Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in Elementary Schools, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 119,
133 (1998).
146. Davis, 526 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
147. See Gorney, supra note 49, at 43 (noting the difficulty in applying standards
developed for the workplace to "the messy emotional lives of schoolchildren").
148. See Ellen Goodman, Editorial, More Than Teasing, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17,
1999, at C7 (arguing for a protective standard for children); Andrea M. Roberts & Paul A.
Bokota, Peer Sexual Harassment Does Title IX Make Schools Liable for Harassment by
Children?, RES GEsTAE, Oct. 1998, at 26 (arguing that, if employees have protection at
work, they also should be protected at the institution of their training). One commentator
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of harassment between employees, Title VII courts have applied a
constructive knowledge standard, finding an employer liable if it
knew or should have known of the harassment.149 The actual
knowledge standard chosen by the Davis Court amounts to a more
difficult standard for plaintiffs to overcome because the school district
will be held liable only if an official knew of the harassment,
regardless of whether the official should have known. 50 In order to
give children the protection they need, the Court in Gebser and in
Davis should have followed the OCR's Guidelines, which apply a
constructive liability standard.''
A constructive standard would be preferable because children
deserve a more protective standard than actual notice because they
are more vulnerable than adults. 5 2  Children are more easily
intimidated by the harassing behavior, may not recognize a
satisfactory redress for harassment, may fear isolation from their
peers in retaliation for turning in a classmate, and may blame
themselves for the harassment. 3  Because children are less
experienced than adults are, they are also less likely to label behavior
as harassment and report it to the appropriate person. 54 Moreover,
school officials exercise more control and supervision over students
than employers do over employees, which also mandates a standard
has noted that the Supreme Court in effect has held that "students are separate, less equal,
and more vulnerable legally ... to sexual harassment under Title IX than are adult
workers under Title VII." Jeffrey A. Thaler, Are Schools Protecting Children from
Harassment? Not Well Enough, and the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Interpretation of
Title IXIs Shielding Schools from Liability, TRIAL, Aug. 1999 at 32,32.
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1999); ACHAMPONG, supra note 111, at 108 (citing
Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 512 (E.D. Va. 1992));
Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 310-11.
150. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 301 (noting that an actual
knowledge standard makes it more difficult to hold school districts liable than the
standard for employers because a student must show the district's actual knowledge rather
than that the district "knew or should have known" of the harassment). Two
commentators noticed a trend that district courts even before Davis were applying an
actual notice standard rather than the constructive notice standard applied in Title VII
cases. See Thompson & Truelock, supra note 136, at 1050.
151. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42 at 12,039; Collins, supra note 117, at 820;
Thaler, supra note 148, at 34.
152. See Butterfield, supra note 78, at 22-23; see also Williams & Brake, supra note 76,
at 428-29 (noting that harassment has a greater impact on young victims and leads to an
institutionalization of sexual harassment as acceptable behavior). Additionally, children
are minors and, consequently, they deserve heightened legal protections. See Giampetro-
Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 318.
153. See Butterfield, supra note 78, at 23.
154. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 794; Kindred, supra note 77, at 220.
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at least equivalent to constructive knowledge."r Teachers have been
viewed as substitute parents,156 inheriting a duty absent in the
employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, students are
compelled to attend school, and transferring to a different school is
often more difficult than changing jobs.157
Some courts have argued that Title VII standards should not be
applied to school children because the power relationship evident in
the employment harassment context does not exist between students
and their peers in a school setting. 58 The argument can be countered,
however, by a recognition that children do manipulate their peers
through peer pressure and by capitalizing on students' desires to fit in
among classmates. 59 Although this power does not affect hire and
fire decisions, it allows students to inflict serious emotional damage
upon each other, unless measures are taken to prevent abuse. Just
like employees, young, vulnerable students who are compelled to
attend a particular school and classroom may not be able to protect
themselves without outside help from school officials and, when
officials fail in their duties, judicial redress.
The requirement of a constructive notice standard would force
schools to develop policies against harassment and to monitor more
closely student interaction in the classroom, arguably leading to the
earlier detection of and, perhaps, prevention of harassment.1 6 In the
155. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 319. Moreover, schools already
have "a broad range of disciplinary options" available to regulate further the behavior of
children. Id. at 325; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 793 (noting that
children are "at the mercy of the schools" in a way adults are not). Students expect both
guidance and protection from teachers, a fact that gives teachers more influence than an
employer has over adults. See Williams & Brake, supra note 76, at 428. In fact, the Court
in Davis referenced other decisions in which the Court has concluded that school districts
do have a degree of control and supervision that could not be exercised over "free adults."
Davis, 526 U.S. at 646 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 & n.9 (1985); Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,507 (1969)).
156. See Thaler, supra note 148, at 37.
157. See Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 78, at 318-19; Miller, supra note 98, at 722;
Williams & Brake, supra note 76, at 429.
158. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1011 n.11 (5th Cir. 1996)
(discussing the absence of a power relationship between students); Collins, supra note 117
at 825.
159. See Butterfield, supra note 78, at 23 (noting that some children may be more
worried about their peer relationships than the harassment itself); Quesada, supra note 94,
at 1053 (noting that a power dynamic is significantly involved in peer harassment due to an
imbalance of power between boys and girls in school).
160. See Giampetro-Meyer et al., supra note 78, at 301 (arguing that a "knew or should
have known" standard is necessary to motivate affirmative action by school districts); see
also The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 368, 374 (1999)
[hereinafter Leading Cases]. Leading Cases suggests that a constructive notice standard
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employment context, the constructive standard encourages employers
to take preemptive action by developing policies that help to prevent
harassment.161 Applying this standard to schools would not place a
heavier burden on school administrators because they already have
some duties to protect children from harm. 62 Instead, by applying an
actual knowledge standard, Davis encourages school districts only to
react to harassment rather than to take a preventative stance against
it. 163
The Davis standard is also problematic because the Court did not
give significant guidance regarding: (1) what constitutes severe and
pervasive behavior to the point of interfering with education; (2) who
must possess actual knowledge of the harassment; or (3) what
constitutes reacting with deliberate indifference 64 Although OCR
Guidelines' 65 and Title VIl166 provide some guidance in applying the
Davis standard, substantial uncertainties remain. Moreover, because
would motivate school officials to create preventative measures against peer harassment
and would better protect plaintiffs such as LaShonda Davis. See Leading Cases, supra, at
374-75.
161. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 127, at 799.
162. See Butterfield, supra note 78, at 38. But see Collins, supra note 117, at 827
(noting the unfairness of subjecting administrators to a "degree of knowledge and legal
sophistication that is highly unrealistic" in expecting them to monitor harassment).
163. See Leading Cases, supra note 160, at 377-78 (stating that a constructive notice
standard would require school officials to take a proactive rather than reactive position
against harassment); see also Wolohan, supra note 78, at 899 (urging administrators to
"take a proactive role in eliminating the sexual harassment of students in the classroom,
hallways, and locker room"); cf. Barry S. Roberts & Richard A. Mann, Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace: A Primer, 29 AKRON L. REV. 269,269 (1996) (arguing that a failure by
employers to take a proactive position regarding workplace sexual harassment will result
in expensive litigation, low employee morale, loss of production, and a negative public
image). The new standard of vicarious liability set out by the Court in the employment
context gives employers even more incentives to take action. See Fink, supra note 70, at
47. One commentator suggests that, by applying the actual knowledge standard in Gebser,
the Court implied that school districts did not need encouragement to re-examine the
manner in which they prohibit sexual harassment in their schools. See Rosenfeld, supra
note 130, at 1098. The Court's reasoning was flawed in light of the pervasiveness and
effects of harassment in schools. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text. The
Court should have provided protection equal to what adult employees receive.
164. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650 (articulating the indifference standard).
165. This Note does not argue that a court would find OCR guidelines binding but
rather that a school district or court could benefit from definitions and suggestions set out
by the agencies. The Supreme Court has ruled that EEOC guidelines should be accorded
deference, see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975), and lower courts
arguably should give the same deference to OCR Guidelines.
166. See SHooP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 84 (suggesting that courts will apply
Meritor principles to Title IX cases). Title VII is a useful guideline for Title IX cases
because both regulate the same behavior and prohibit discriminatory atmospheres. See
Williams & Brake, supra note 76, at 451.
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the Davis Court rejected the application of OCR Guidelines and Title
VII case law with regard to constructive notice, it is not clear how
much weight courts will give those sources in future Title IX rulings.
Because no straightforward guidelines exist for courts to follow in
analyzing Title IX cases, however, courts should look to OCR
Guidelines and Title VII case law for assistance until more guidance
is provided.
One way in which OCR Guidelines and Title VII case law may
offer guidance to courts is by defining harassment. Schools and
courts may find it difficult to discern what rises to the level of
actionable sexual harassment under Davis, especially because
adolescents commonly engage in teasing and other childish
behavior.167 In fact, the difficulty that schools face in recognizing and
reacting to peer sexual harassment has been evidenced by cases like
that of a child being suspended for a harmless kiss.168 The decision in
MeNtor spawned a similar debate over what constitutes harassment in
the workplace. 69
In the employment context, to determine whether harassment
rises to the level of severe and pervasive, the Court has suggested
weighing several factors. These factors include: whether the
discrimination was frequent and severe, whether the behavior was
167. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Davis dissenters pointed
out that schools would now be faced with litigation from both sides, sued by the victim for
not responding and sued by the alleged harasser for responding unreasonably to childish
behavior. See id. at 682 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). One commentator has asked what the
harasser did to make Justice Kennedy characterize what happened to LaShonda as normal
childish behavior: "Was it when he slid a doorstop into his pants and made sexually
explicit gestures to her during gym class? Was it when he groped her in the hall? ... Was
it when he pleaded guilty to sexual battery?" Eileen McNamara, It Wasn't Just "Teasing,"
Judge, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26,1999, at B1.
168. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, High Court Reviews Sexual Harassment, WASH. POST,
Jan. 11, 1999, at A6 (referencing an incident in 1996 when a child in North Carolina was
suspended for kissing a classmate). According to Davis, a funding recipient would not be
liable for simple bantering or teasing, and the determination whether certain behavior
rises to sexual harassment would depend on many different circumstances. See Davis, 526
U.S. at 651-52. The Court included "insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and
gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the students subjected to it" as actions that
would not qualify for liability under Title IX. Id. This instruction to examine the totality
of the circumstances also appears in the employment context. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b)
(1999) (stating that, in its investigations of harassment, the EEOC will examine "the
record as a whole" and "the totality of the circumstances").
169. See Roberts & Mann, supra note 163, at 277 (stating that Meritor "gave rise to a
debate over ... [w]hat degree of abuse is needed to constitute hostility that interferes
unreasonably with a victim's work performance"); see also Kindred, supra note 77, at 214
(stating that Meritor left unanswered the question of what level of severity constitutes
hostile environment harassment).
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physically threatening or humiliating or merely offensive, and
whether the discrimination unreasonably interfered with the
employee's work performance.170 Courts tend to apply an objective
standard, asking whether the conduct would offend a reasonable
person rather than whether it offended the particular victim.'7 ' The
OCR Guidelines also list a number of factors to be considered in
assessing severity in peer harassment cases, such as the degree to
which a student's education was affected, the frequency of the
conduct, the relationship between the harasser and the victim, and the
age and sex of the harasser.72 The Guidelines suggest that both a
subjective and objective perspective should be used in analyzing this
severity element. 73
Because both Title VII law and OCR Guidelines recommend
weighing similar factors in assessing the level of actionable
harassment in discrimination cases, lower courts may utilize these
same factors for guidance in applying the Davis test. Many courts
analyzing Title VII cases, however, encounter difficulty in
determining the level of harassment that is actionable, 74 suggesting
that determining what constitutes harassment will continue to be
problematic for school districts and courts. 75
A second issue that may create difficulties after Davis is defining
what constitutes actual notice. The Davis Court stated that a Title IX
action will succeed only if the funding recipient with knowledge of the
170. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). Additionally, quick
reporting and investigation of claims could keep conduct from becoming severe and
pervasive. See White, supra note 106, at 748.
171. See Starkman, supra note 70, at 319-20.
172. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,041-42. These factors are consistent
with Davis, which suggested that circumstances such as age and the number of students
involved should be examined. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
173. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,041.
174. See Starkman, supra note 70, at 319 (stating that "[tlhe line between actionable
hostile work environment harassment and non-actionable conduct remains as amorphous
as ever").
175. Although there is no bright-line test for actionable harassment, courts in the Title
VII context tend to find a hostile environment when the following are present: sexual
propositions, pornography, remarkably vulgar language, sexual touching, degrading
comments, or embarrassing questions or jokes. See Roberts & Mann, supra note 163, at
277. Analogous behavior by students likely will rise to actionable harassment as well.
Some commentators predict that behavior that could constitute harassment includes
sexually suggestive comments, unwelcome touching, verbal abuse and obscenities,
propositioning female students as they pass in the hall, grabbing females, and pulling down
the pants of females or lifting up their skirts. See SHOOP & EDWARDS, supra note 75, at
116. Behavior that would likely not constitute sexual harassment includes a male pressing
up against a female student once in the hall, an isolated incident of gender-related jokes,
or a single request for a date, even if the request is unwelcome. See id at 117.
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harassment has the authority to take action. For example, a court
would examine "the recipient's degree of control over the harasser
and the environment in which the harassment occurs."' 176 Beyond this
vague description of what a court should examine, the Court offered
no further guidance in establishing what level of official and authority
should be held liable. 77  This ambiguity could lead school
administrators to close lines of communication with teachers so that
administrators can argue that their districts should not be held liable
because school authorities never had actual knowledge of the
harassment."' Such a result does not serve the interests of students.
Title VII principles have established that notice must be given to
the employer or someone with the employer's authority to make
personnel changes, rather than just a simple supervisor lacking such
control.179 In contrast to developments under Title VII standards,
however, OCR Guidelines suggest that if "an agent or responsible
employee" knows of the harassment, the school also has
knowledge. 80 A teacher appears to fall under the OCR's definition
of an agent or employee of the school. The Court in Davis, however,
chose not to defer to the OCR's guidance regarding the correct
standard of liability.'8 ' In the future, the Court could decide to follow
the Title VII approach and require that an official with higher
authority than a teacher know of the harassment. This approach,
however, would not afford children the protection they deserve.
Because teachers are the authorities with the most supervision and
control over students on a daily basis,'82 courts should hold that notice
to a teacher is sufficient to constitute actual knowledge by the school
176. Davis, 526 U.S. at 644. Title VII cases similarly examine whether someone who
has the authority to remedy the harassment received notice. See Thompson & Truelock,
supra note 136, at 1052.
177. See Leading Cases, supra note 160, at 377. Two commentators predict that the
problem of who must receive notice will make it difficult for children to succeed in
establishing a school district's actual knowledge. See Thompson & Truelock, supra note
136, at 1052.
178. See Leading Cases, supra note 160, at 377 (arguing that a school board, if it is the
entity required to have actual knowledge, may close lines of communication, allowing
teachers to ignore outrageous harassment as long as the school board has no knowledge
and, thus, no liability).
179. See Starkman, supra note 70, at 326; Thompson & Truelock, supra note 136, at
1053.
180. OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,042. The Guidelines explain that schools
can receive notice of harassment by: (1) the student filing a complaint; (2) a student or
parent reporting the conduct to school personnel; (3) an agent witnessing the harassment;
or (4) in an indirect manner, such as by a media report. See id.
181. See supra note 151.
182. See supra notes 155-56 (discussing control of teachers).
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district.
Another difficulty Davis leaves unanswered is defining what
constitutes deliberate indifference in responding to harassment.183
The only instruction given by the Court was that the reaction by
school officials may not be clearly unreasonable." Based on Title
VII principles, courts will analyze the actions of a school district only
after the district had notice and will judge schools by the
reasonableness of their reaction to the harassment, not by their
success in terminating it.185
OCR Guidelines suggest that immediate, appropriate action
should be taken once a school official has knowledge of
harassment.'86 The Davis Court approved this standard despite
disagreeing with the OCR on other issues.1'7 In its holding, the Court
sent a clear message that parallels the OCR Guidelines: a school
official with actual notice must take prompt action in response to a
report of peer sexual harassment. 188 Although not required by Davis,
a preventative approach to harassment and creation of a sexual
harassment policy and grievance procedure would offer children the
protection they need and deserve. 189
In addition to these difficulties in interpreting Davis's standard,
several other issues remain unresolved in connection with Title IX
litigation. For example, the Court in Davis did not confront the issue
of punitive damages, 90 which may or may not be available under Title
183. See Gorney, supra note 49, at 43 (predicting that officials will "scramble to figure
out what 'deliberate indifference' means").
184. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
185. See Thompson & Truelock, supra note 136, at 1053.
186. See OCR Guidelines, supra note 42, at 12,042. Furthermore, the agency
elaborates on responding to student reports or eye-witness accounts of harassment,
responding to indirect notice of harassment, and responding to harassed students' requests
for confidentiality. See iL at 12,042-44.
187. See supra notes 142-63 and accompanying text (discussing constructive notice).
188. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650; Gorney, supra note 49, at 43; see also Schools May Be
Liable for Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment, MICH. EMPLOYMENT L. LETrER, July
1999, 3, 3 (recommending that school officials take complaints of sexual harassment
seriously, investigate promptly, and discipline appropriately). Compare Gorney, supra
note 49, at 43 (urging schools not to ignore complaints of sexual harassment but rather to
"intervene at least actively enough to avoid being accused of 'deliberate indifference' "),
with Roberts & Mann, supra note 163, at 286 (suggesting that employers must take
aggressive action and respond quickly to complaints of workplace harassment).
189. See Thompson & Truelock, supra note 136, at 1054.
190. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 680-81 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Michael Delikat
& Rene Kathawala, Sexual Harassment in Schools: Courts as Arbitrators of Schoolyard
Conduct, N.Y. LU., Aug. 2, 1999, at 1 (noting that punitive damages were not specifically
addressed by the Davis Court).
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IX. 1 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to include the recovery of
punitive damages.'9 Title VII includes damage caps in its express
cause of action; the Court in Davis and in previous decisions,
however, included no such limitation on Title IX damages.1 3 The
dissent shrewdly suggested that without a limitation on damages,
"school liability in one peer sexual harassment suit could approach, or
even exceed, the total federal funding of many school districts. 194
Because the Davis majority shied away from adopting Title VII
analogies in applying a standard to Title IX cases, it might not set a
cap on damages to allow schools the same protections that employers
are furnished.19 5 Limitations on punitive damages therefore may be
"the next important Title IX battle.1 9 6
In sum, Davis made certain important strides in clarifying Title
191. See Delikat & Kathawala, supra note 190, at 1 (finding support in Davis for the
proposition that punitive damages are not available as a Title IX remedy). But see
Vargyas, supra note 117, at 377 (suggesting that the analysis in Franklin implies the
availability of punitive damages).
192. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994)). Plaintiffs may collect punitive damages only if they
show an employer acted with malice or reckless indifference. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
One commentator suggests that Congress added punitive damages as an available remedy
under Title VII because hostile environment sexual harassment plaintiffs suffer no out-of-
pocket losses and, therefore, had no remedy under the statute's previous provision
allowing only equitable relief. See White, supra note 106, at 739.
193. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
194. 1d (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
195. See id. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that "[t]he limitless liability
confronting our schools under the implied Title IX cause of action puts schools in a far
worse position than businesses").
196. Delikat & Kathawala, supra note 190, at 1. The Court in Franklin examined
whether Congress clearly expressed its intent concerning damages and whether punitive
damages would be appropriate. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60,
71-76 (1992). Delikat and Kathawala suggest that the importance of congressional intent
would weigh against allowing punitive damages in Title IX cases. See Delikat &
Kathawala, supra note 190, at 1.
Another difficulty that remains for further litigation involves the First
Amendment issues intertwined with sexual harassment as officials struggle to discern
prohibited harassment from protected speech. See Kindred, supra note 77, at 222.
Because of the immaturity of school children, their free speech rights are somewhat more
limited than the rights of adults. See id. For a detailed discussion of the development of
free speech in the schools, see iaL at 227-39. Because officials have substantial power to
govern speech in schools, most cases of harassing speech would be susceptible to
prohibition without infringing on First Amendment rights. See id. at 239.
Another issue that may appear in future litigation is whether an individual teacher
may be sued under Title IX. See Murrell v. School Dist. No. 1 (Denver Public Schools),
186 F.3d 1238, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Most lower courts have held that Title VII does not include an action for
individual liability and courts would likely hold the same in Title IX cases. See Fink, supra
note 70, at 25; Starkman, supra note 70, at 326-27.
1602 [Vol. 78
STUDENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT
IX by settling the issue of liability for student-on-student harassment
and choosing a standard by which these cases should be judged.
School districts now should be on notice that if an appropriate official
knows of sufficient sexual harassment and is deliberately indifferent
in responding to the harassment, the school district could be held
liable for damages in a private cause of action brought by the victim.
Until Davis, these important standards remained unclear.
Yet, although Davis did settle particular issues of liability, it left
critical issues unresolved. The Court did not, and perhaps could not,
offer a bright-line test by which school officials can distinguish
between sexual harassment and childish behavior,197 or by which
courts can determine what constitutes an official with actual
knowledge. Nor did the Court specify what response rises to the
level of deliberate indifference. 199 Much discretion remains in the
hands of school officials and lower courts to define the test the Court
articulated, but courts and school officials should use existing Title
VII principles and OCR Guidelines to flesh out the standard.
Although the contours of Title IX liability may take years to map out,
after Davis, school officials will be more cautious in dismissing a
student's claim of sexual harassment because they now know that
they are responsible for the hostility of the school environment. In
cases like Murrell,20° in which the facts show clear, deliberate
indifference and actual knowledge by school officials, plaintiffs will
succeed in holding school districts liable for discrimination.
Ultimately, however, many children will remain helpless victims of
peer harassment because of the Supreme Court's rejection of
constructive notice in favor of an actual notice standard, which will be
difficult to meet absent egregious circumstances such as those in
Murrell.?' That will be the tragic legacy of Davis.
KELLY DIXSON FURR
197. See supra notes 167-75 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text.
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